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1  Introduction: industrial policy during import substitution industrialization 
Industrial policies seek to change a country’s production structure, which necessarily 
implies the creation of new industries (ECLAC 2007). In Latin America import 
substitution industrialization (ISI) prioritized the creation of new sectors and the 
diversification of the production structures, with the objective of changing the prevalent 
specialization pattern and increasing the weight of technology-intensive activities in the 
production structure. ISI also responded to the need of endogenizing the effects of 
domestic demand growth, channelling it to productive investments and avoiding 
fuelling imports, which would have deteriorated the trade balance. 
In the 1970s most industry analysts highlighted that investment had two complementary 
effects on the economy. On the one hand, there was a supply effect through the creation 
of production capacity (capital accumulation), on the other hand, a demand effect on the 
production of capital goods. Given that the domestic supply of these goods was 
insufficient, the demand effect was mostly transferred abroad through increasing imports. 
Such process generated stop- and-go cycles derived from recurring trade imbalances. This, 
together with the recognition of potential knowledge and productivity spill-overs derived 
from technical progress embedded in capital goods production, were the rationale behind 
programmes to foster the domestic production of such goods in the largest countries of the 
region, mainly Brazil and Mexico. 
During the ISI, industrial policies combined trade protection with investment promotion 
(both state and foreign investments were supported) and national development banks 
were the main financing agents. Two of the most notable examples of industrial policies 
in the region during the 1970s were the Second National Development Plan of Brazil, 
and the National Industrial Development Program 1979–82 of Mexico, which coincided 
with its boom in oil exports. 
Industrial policies programmed the expansion of domestic supply in an effort to change 
the prevailing specialization pattern of the production structure. Three inter-related 
factors were at the basis of the strength of those policies: (i) the organization of the 
public sector development apparatus according to sectoral and even sub-sectoral 
structures,1 (ii) the existence of sectoral business associations (chambers) representing 
the interests of private enterprises, which were the principal defenders of trade 
protection, and (iii)  the existence of negative or positive sectoral preference lists in 
international trade negotiations, such as those carried through under the Latin American 
Integration Association, the Central American Common Market, the Caribbean 
Community or the Andean Pact. Although policies tended to focus both on the 
agricultural and the manufacturing sectors, the weight of the latter was such that the 
term ‘sectoral policy’ tended to be associated with policy for the manufacturing 
industry. 
However, during the debt crisis and the ‘lost decade’ of the 1980s the ISI model was the 
object of serious critiques and industrial policies lost their leading role. There were 
several reasons for this: (1) public enterprises that had traditionally invested directly in 
new sectors were either privatized or closed, reflecting the new view that the state 
                                                 
1  For example, ministries of industry, agriculture, mining, and others, and the corresponding general 
directorates for food, metal manufactures and machinery, chemicals, capital goods, and so forth.   2
should play only a subsidiary role in economic growth, (2) the need to balance public 
finances meant eliminating subsidies, particularly fiscal ones and the subsidy 
components of credit operations, and (3) there was a (sometimes controversial) 
perception that many investments suffered from bad planning, poor project management 
and corruption, and in some cases implied high inefficiencies—the so-called ‘white 
elephants’. Beyond these implementation problems that weakened the standing of 
industrial policies already in the 1970s, orthodox analyses insisted that these policies 
were bad per se and that the ISI strategy had been a big mistake which substituted 
(usually wrong) policy decisions for market signals. Thus, resources were 
misallocated—too much capital and too little labour were used in economies with scarce 
capital and an almost unlimited labour supply. 
In this context, industrial policy became a sort of ‘bad word’ better not to be 
pronounced in ‘correct’ political discourses. Hence, industrial policy, at least in its more 
strict formulation, ended up being practically excluded from the new economic model 
that was established by market-friendly economic reforms. This loss of legitimacy of 
industrial policy, however, did not occur homogeneously in all the regions of the world. 
It was much pronounced in Latin America. For example, in several countries of East 
and South East Asia, active sectoral policies, sometimes even with targeting at the firm 
level, remained in force until the mid-1990s—fading gradually, and at different rates, as 
domestic production and technological capabilities were gaining competitiveness. 
Apart from the orthodox economic arguments against industrial policy, political 
opposition to the new economic model came from agents who supported the previous 
paradigm, thereby consolidating the ‘developmentalist vs. neoliberal’ stereotype. 
Agents in favour of the economic reforms portrayed sectoral industrial policies as 
distortions in resource allocation and accused them of being at the origin of recurrent 
fiscal deficits that fuelled inflationary pressures and trade imbalances. Although most 
governments in the region shared this negative stance towards industrial policy,2 such 
an extreme view did not always coincide with de facto policy measures. Even strongly 
reformist governments, such as those of presidents Menem in Argentina, Collor de Melo 
in Brazil, and Salinas de Gortari in Mexico, maintained certain sectoral policies, in 
particular for the automotive industry, beyond their plain support of the market-led 
economic model. 
2  Industrial policy after the economic reforms 
2.1 National  strategies 
Much of the region’s experience in industrial policy during the Washington Consensus 
era is summarized by the term ‘competitiveness policies’ (Peres 1997). In the mid-
1990s, almost all countries in the region designed programmes to support the 
competitiveness of their economies. In this respect we can identify three groups of 
countries. First, countries such as Brazil, Mexico, and some of the English-speaking 
Caribbean (e.g. Jamaica), elaborated policy documents specifically targeted to the 
manufacturing sector, analysing its role in national competitiveness and highlighting its 
                                                 
2  In the early 1990s, it was frequent to hear high-ranking macroeconomic policy officials propounding 
the view that ‘the best industrial policy is no industrial policy’. Although simplistic, that phrase aptly 
reflected their position on the subject.   3
linkages with technological development and with an efficient participation in 
international trade.3 These documents constituted working agendas elaborated by the 
government together with the private sector, but did have neither the form nor the 
contents of former industrial development plans. Critics accused them of being 
‘programmes without targets’ and, what was even worse, ‘without resources’. 
The focus on competitiveness pervaded also the Andean and the Central American 
countries. In this second group, the predominant approach was to enhance 
competitiveness of the economy as a whole, without explicitly targeting the 
manufacturing industry. The national competitiveness strategies were based on the 
cluster methodology, albeit under a variety of names, mainly, industrial agglomerations 
or ‘conglomerates’.4 From the policy implementation standpoint, those activities 
resulted in the negotiation and implementation of sectoral agreements between private 
agents and the government for specific value chains, where the latter played the role of 
catalyst or ‘facilitator’. 
Cluster development policies expanded quickly throughout the region. In some 
countries, they became the core of national competitiveness strategies; e.g. in Colombia, 
whose very pro-active and sustained strategy is strongly cluster based,5 or in El 
Salvador, which has developed significant efforts to design policies to support small and 
micro firms within specific clusters (Ministerio de Economía 2005). Policies to promote 
clusters have been extensively implemented also at the sub-national level, and countries 
such as Mexico and Brazil built up strong capabilities to support local development. 
Incentives for the footwear cluster in the state of Guanajuato or the electronics industry 
in the state of Jalisco (Mexico) are two relevant examples (Unger 2003; Dussel Peters 
1999). In Brazil the main player has been the Brazilian Service to Support Micro and 
Small Enterprises (SEBRAE), which implemented programmes throughout the 
country—one of its most extensive programmes has been the one to develop local 
clusters (arranjos produtivos locais, APL). The legitimacy enjoyed by cluster policies, 
especially among international financial organizations, has facilitated their acceptance 
by governments. At the same time, the general consensus on cluster policies led to 
include under this category a mixed series of public support programmes which indeed 
have neither a production chain nor a geographic conglomerate scope. 
The third group of countries includes those that did not implement any formal industrial 
policy or selective national competitiveness strategy, focusing basically on horizontal 
                                                 
3  Pérez Caltendey (2003) highlights the intensity of sectoral incentives in the Caribbean economies, 
particularly in member countries of the Association of Eastern Caribbean States, and in Barbados and 
Guyana, the latter having the broadest package of incentives in the region. Those incentives basically 
targeted the manufacturing and service sectors, particularly hotels and tourism. 
4  This approach was developed on the basis of Porter (1990), and was materialized in policy proposals 
by Monitor Company in the Andean countries in the early 1990s, and in the project ‘Central America 
in the twenty-first century: an agenda for competitiveness and sustainable development’, coordinated 
by INCAE/CLADS (Costa Rica) in the middle of that decade. In these countries, in the second half of 
the decade of 2000, the approach suggested by Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) and Rodrik (2004) to 
view development as a process of self-discovery contributed to the debate on industrial policy. 
5  Colombia’s 2008 National Competitiveness and Productivity Policy focuses on five strategies: 
development of world class clusters, acceleration of productivity and employment creation, reduction 
of the informal economy, support to science, technology and innovation, and horizontal actions to 
foster competition and investment (Gómez Restrepo 2009).   4
interventions.6 Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay privileged neutral interventions that did 
not discriminate between sectors and which were basically oriented by firms’ demand 
(contrary to the previous supply side-oriented model). However, those countries 
managed their horizontal programmes in a pragmatic way, introducing a sectoral focus 
every time that there was a ‘sectoral’ problem. Thus, in Chile the supposed neutral 
character of the policies did not prevent the government from directly supporting the 
forestry and the mining (coal) sectors and some key export activities for a long time 
(Moguillansky 2000). 
Chile’s approach to competitiveness began to change around 2005. The National 
Strategy of Innovation for Competitiveness presented in 2007 put special attention to 
actions aimed at developing some clusters, basically related to natural resources 
processing. This new strategy showed that policy makers were changing their 
perspective and accepting policies beyond horizontal or neutral ones, an approach which 
had prevailed in the country for decades (Agosín, Larraín, and Grau 2009). Early 2010, 
this strategy was complemented by the Innovation and Competitiveness Agenda 2010–
20 that defined priorities at the cluster level and some horizontal ‘bases’ to foster 
innovation at the firm level and production diversification, all this supported by science, 
technology, and human capital development (Consejo Nacional de Innovación para la 
Competitividad 2007–08 and 2010). 
2.2  Policy lines and instruments 
Regional policies, even those with sectoral scope, have focused much more on 
enhancing the efficiency of existing sectors than on creating new ones (Melo and 
Rodríguez-Clare 2006; Melo 2001; Peres 1997). This is consistent with the search for 
greater penetration in international markets, grounded essentially on the pursuit of static 
comparative advantages (unskilled labour and natural resources). This has been the case 
both in countries with a diversified production structure, such as Brazil and Mexico, as 
well as in those whose production structures are concentrated in few activities. In the 
more diversified countries, it could be argued that there are few non-existent sectors, so 
a sectoral policy could only be detected at the level of specific products. Although this 
might be true, the evidence, especially in Mexico and to a lesser extent in Brazil until 
the 2008 industrial policy, suggests that sectoral measures have focused on 
strengthening and expanding existing sectors; the clearest example being the automotive 
industry.. 
The creation of new activities appeared sporadically as a policy objective, mainly 
related to international trade negotiations aimed at increasing market access and to the 
attraction of foreign direct investment (FDI). Policy initiatives resulted in the expansion 
of Mexico’s export platform in the framework of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement between Mexico, Canada, and the USA (NAFTA) (automobiles and 
transport equipment components, electronics and clothing); the promotion of the basic 
assembly activities (maquiladoras) in a number of Central American and Caribbean 
                                                 
6  The term ‘neutral’ or ‘horizontal’ policy, which is widely used in the region, conceals the fact that any 
policy is bound to favour some sectors more than others ex post. This is because such policies aim to 
enhance the operating efficiency of markets for factors of production which are used with varying 
intensity according to the sector or product in question. In some cases, policies are presented as 
neutral to gain greater legitimacy, despite being aimed at specific sectors from the outset. This 
frequently happens with technological development policies.   5
countries (clothing); and investments in privatized firms in the services and primary 
sectors in South American countries. Different combinations of sectoral policies and 
transnational corporations’ strategies induced a certain level of production 
diversification. Nonetheless, this strategy had limitations, such as low value-added in 
the assembly activities, weak linkages to the domestic economy, and the consequent 
scant generation of endogenous technological capabilities (Mortimore 2002; Peres and 
Reinhardt 2000). 
Three types of instruments have been used to attract FDI: direct incentives, basically 
export free zones and special tax regimes; creation of business friendly environments—
rule of law, transparency, access to international markets, infrastructure, etc.—and 
development of specialized production factors, particularly skilled labour (Mortimore 
and Peres 1998). Most Latin American countries applied these three types of 
instruments; however, the first and the second were the most frequent. Rather similar 
tools have been used to promote investment in general, both domestic and foreign. 
Besides fiscal and credit incentives, governments tried to develop competitive 
environments (defence of competition and regulation of highly concentrated sectors) to 
reduce transaction costs (e.g. through deregulation) and to create conditions to attain 
economies of scale (sectoral agreements along value chains, support to network and 
cluster creation, etc.).  
Policy instruments in the region enjoy different degrees of legitimacy. Thus, according 
to this criterion, we can identify three groups of industrial policies: winning, losing, and 
emerging (Peres 1997). 
Winning policies include those that are generally accepted by governments, i.e. they 
enjoy strong legitimacy. In addition to the policies for export promotion and FDI 
attraction, this group also includes policies to foster science, technology, and 
innovation,7 human resources development, support to small and micro firms—
generally through establishment or consolidation of networks or clusters8— and local 
development, the latter two being closely linked. Acceptance of these policies stems 
from their assumed neutrality since they operate on factor markets (technology and 
labour), or because of their (also supposed) positive impact on job creation, basically at 
the sub-national or local levels. 
Losing policies, in contrast, are clearly contrary to the prevailing free-market approach. 
They include direct fiscal subsidies, targeted credits with subsidized interest rates, trade 
tariffs, and government procurement. In terms of the latter, the situation varies from one 
country to another: while some use it nationally or sub-nationally, such as Brazil, in 
others it is out of the policy agenda because its use is deemed contrary to the goals of 
expenditure efficiency and transparency. 
                                                 
7  A few years ago, most science and technology policies were concentrated in the largest or richest 
countries in the region; recently such efforts expanded to smaller economies such Nicaragua and 
Panama in Central America, and Bolivia, Ecuador, and Paraguay in South America. 
8  A case in point is Bolivia, whose 2008 Constitution establishes that small and micro firms will be 
protected and promoted by the State (Article 318, II). See Ministerio de Desarrollo Productivo y 
Economía Plural (2009).   6
Emerging policies, which, among other, encompass competition policy, improvement 
of corporate governance regimes, regulation of infrastructure sectors where markets do 
not operate efficiently, or corporate social responsibility, enjoy increasing legitimacy, 
but have not yet reached consensus and do not have a strong constituency. Some 
countries have modern legislation and relatively strong institutions to enforce them, 
whereas in others, they are still at the discussion and decision stages. Usually such 
policies are not a significant item on the policy agenda. 
Beyond the different approaches to sectoral policies, the region displays a strong 
convergence in terms of policy design over the last decade, centred around five basic 
elements: (i) emphasis on increasing international trade competitiveness; (ii) generalization 
of the legitimacy of horizontal or neutral instruments, which, as mentioned above, are not 
horizontal or neutral ex post; (iii) support for small businesses and micro-enterprises, 
basically for reasons linked to their job creation capacity; (iv) efforts to design science, 
technology, and innovation policies aimed at advancing towards knowledge-based 
economies; and (v) focus on sub-national or local economic areas. The boom of cluster 
support programmes provides the clearest example of the combination of these elements; 
the already mentioned SEBRAE programmes to support clusters in Brazil being the most 
important in the region. 
This convergence has been extremely stable in the long run, which is an indication that the 
region accumulated capabilities and experience in policy formulation. Moreover, changes 
of government, even when there entailed a significant break with the countries’ past 
policies, such as in Mexico in 2000 or Uruguay in 2005, have not produced major 
changes in attitudes towards industrial policies. The set of countries belonging to the 
three above mentioned categories is sticky. Two examples, albeit in different directions, 
are the constant marginal relevance of sectoral policies in Chile, and the continuity of 
sectoral agreements to support export competitiveness in Colombia during the 
administrations of presidents Samper, Pastrana and Uribe (1994–2010).9 This progress 
in institutional development should not be overstated, because cases of programmes 
design just to overcome or muddle through short-term competitiveness problems are still 
frequent.10 Even in Brazil, the policy for the automotive industry in the 1990 contained 
elements that pointed more to the rescue of a sector in crisis (unable to face external 
competition) than to a long-term oriented policy for supporting a leading sector (Bonelli 
and Motta Veiga 2003). 
2.3  The reemergence of sectoral policies 
Unlike other policies, which are considered winning, losing or emerging in almost all 
countries of the region, there is no consensus on sectoral policies. Whereas some 
countries have a discourse that clearly rejects such policies, despite providing some ad 
hoc sectoral support in practice, other countries recognize the validity of targeted 
                                                 
9  Such agreements encompassed 41 production chains and sectors accounting for 86 per cent of all non-
traditional exports. Of these, 31 are national and 10 regional, 29 correspond to goods and 12 to 
services. Not all of them are programmes for cluster strictly defined; some target specific sectors 
(potatoes, farmed shrimp, tuna, trawled shrimp, flowers, coffee, and bananas). The relatively loose 
application of the productive chain concept reflects the fact that most of the agreements were signed 
for pragmatic reasons aimed at mobilizing entrepreneurs (Velasco 2003). 
10 See Scarone (2003) on policies in Uruguay and Villagómez (2003) on the 2002–10 electronics 
industry programme in Mexico.   7
policies for increasing the competitiveness of activities with strong growth or export 
potential, or that are facing strong competition from imports. There is a double standard 
with respect to sectoral policies: some countries deny their usefulness, especially when 
they support the manufacturing sector, but when it comes to the support of agricultural, 
mining, and service sectors (e.g. tourism) the same countries use them openly, without 
facing any pressure to legitimize them. 
The return of sectoral industrial policies has been a slow process. In this direction, after 
the 2001 crisis, Argentina selected nine production chains to be supported by the 
National Forum for Industrial Competitiveness and Production Chains.11 The following 
year, Mexico launched its 2002 Economic Policy for Competitiveness that defined 12 
branches to be promoted through sectoral programmes. Four of these were formulated 
after a short period (textiles and garments, leather and footwear, electronics and high 
tech, and software), while others took much longer or were not formulated. More 
recently, the Mexican government defined ‘Ten Guidelines to Increase Competitiveness 
2008–12’ that include promoting the upgrading of the automotive, electrical and 
electronics, steel and aeronautics industries, and restructuring of mature industries such 
as textiles and garments, leather and footwear, furniture, toys, chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals and agribusiness, as well as support for biotech, nanotech, and 
mechatronics (Secretaría de Economía 2007). 
As mentioned above, even Chile moved, in 2007–10, from pure horizontal policies 
towards a new approach to innovation, this time based on the selection of a set of 
priority clusters: selected foodstuff, mining, tourism, logistics and transportation, 
financial services, outsourcing, construction, and broadband internet (Consejo Nacional 
de Innovación para la Competitividad 2007–08 and 2010). Other countries, such as 
Costa Rica, Peru, and Uruguay, targeted development actions in even greater detail, 
supporting individual projects in given firms. Examples include investment incentives 
in megaprojects in the Peruvian mining sector,12 measures taken by the government of 
Costa Rica to encourage INTEL to establish operations in the country (Alonso 2003), or 
tax exemptions in support of projects declared to be in national interest in Uruguay.13  
Beyond these cases, the comeback of sectoral policies is best exemplified by Brazil. In 
November 2003, the government announced the Guidelines for an Industrial, 
Technology and Foreign Trade Policy (PITCE), which set out its strategic sectoral 
alternatives in four knowledge-intensive activities: semi-conductors, software, 
                                                 
11 The sectors are wood and furniture, leather and leather products, textiles and apparel, agricultural 
machinery, building materials, software, biotechnology, natural gas for automobiles, and cultural 
industries. See Subsecretaría de Industria (www.industria.gov.ar/foros/institucional.htm).  
12 In Peru, the main policies implemented in support of the mining sector in the 1990s were as follows: 
promotion and guarantees for FDI, privatization of state-owned enterprises, approval of a framework 
law guaranteeing free enterprise and private investments, tax, exchange rate and administrative 
stability, modernization of the mining concessions process, tax benefits (reinvested profits are exempt 
from income tax); tax incentives for investment in megaprojects (income tax exemptions and advance 
drawback of the general sales tax). See Fairlie (2003). 
13 The 1998 Investments Act allows the government to promote specific investments by declaring a 
project to be of national interest. Benefits can be general or specific to a given project (e.g. tax 
exemption for real estate property). General benefits can be automatic (e.g. exemption from the wealth 
tax on movable property destined for the productive cycle), or discretionary (not regulated as of mid-
2003). See Scarone (2003).   8
pharmaceuticals and medicines, and capital goods.14 This policy was accompanied by 
the creation of a new institution in charge of the coordination and implementation of 
that policy, the Brazilian Industrial Development Agency (ABDI). The PITCE marked 
the return of industrial policies to the country’s development agenda. 
As mentioned above, in 2008, Brazil launched its ‘Productive (i.e. Production) 
Development Policy: Innovate and Invest to Sustain Growth’ (PDP), which has an even 
stronger sectoral focus. Beyond horizontal, basically fiscal, measures and six strategic 
technological programmes under the control of the Ministry of Science and 
Technology,15 this policy includes seven programmes targeted to leading sectors under 
the control of the National Economic and Social Development Bank (BNDES): 
aeronautics, oil, natural gas and petro-chemicals, bio-ethanol, mining, steel, pulp and 
paper, meat, and twelve industrial competitiveness programmes, under the direct control 
of the Ministry for Development, Industry and Foreign Trade (MDIC): automobiles, 
capital goods, textiles and garments, wood and furniture, cosmetics, civil construction, 
services, shipbuilding, leather, footwear and leather goods, agribusiness, biodiesel, 
plastics, and other sectoral programmes (Government of Brazil 2008; Ferraz, Nassif, 
and Oliva 2009). Up to now, this is the most advanced and ambitious industrial policy 
undertaken in the region. 
Implementation of the PDP faced an immediate challenge: four months after its 
launching the international financial crisis changed most of the parameters this policy 
was based upon. The task then was much more to prevent a deep economic fall than to 
sustain investment and growth. However, Brazil’s rapid recovery in 2009 and very fast 
growth in 2010 reopened space for the PDP and the country undertook its expansion for 
2010–14. 
In August 2011, the government that took office in January issued a new industrial 
policy (the Plano Brasil Maior) which implies a move towards a stronger role for 
horizontal policies, keeping some of the main instruments aimed at supporting labour- 
and technology-intensive sectors. The new plan has a wider scope than the PDP and 
includes policies not only to foster investment, innovation, and foreign trade, but also to 
protect the domestic market and local manufacturing.  This is particularly important in a 
context in which the big appreciation of the local currency puts domestic production 
under hard competition from imports.16   
 
                                                 
14 Those sectors were selected because (i) they display sustained and increasing dynamism, (ii) they 
account for significant proportions of international investments in research and development, (iii) they 
open up new business opportunities, (iv) they are directly related to innovations in processes, products 
and modes of use, (v) they increase the density of the productive fabric, and (vi) they are important for 
the future of the country and have potential for the development of dynamic comparative advantages 
(MDIC 2003). These guidelines were strengthened by the Growth Acceleration Program, enacted in 
February 2007, which relies mainly on fiscal incentives. 
15 The technological programs (health, ICT, defense, nuclear energy, bio- and nanotechnologies) 
prioritize areas of strategic importance for the medium- and long-term, and actually point, in some 
cases to the very creation of a sector and not to its strengthening, as it is for the nanotechnology. 
16 See: www.brasilmaior.mdic.gov.br/oplano/brasilmaior   9
3  Implementation and evaluation 
Latin American countries have made significant progress regarding industrial policy 
formulation. Most market-distorting policy instruments were eliminated or phased out, 
and subjects such as technological innovation, clusters and small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SME) were included, or became more important, in the policy agenda. 
Besides, governments now tend to approach industrial policy from a much more 
systemic view than in the past. In all these aspects, the reemergence of industrial 
policies in the region is not just the revamping of ISI policies, but a combination of new 
and old objectives and instruments, such as cluster development and structural change, 
or technology funds and state procurement, respectively. 
Conversely, the implementation and evaluation of impacts are still weak in the region. 
Although there are some data on the funding allocated to certain policies (actually 
programmes or projects), the information is insufficient to evaluate implementation 
overall. Despite this, it has been shown that, with some exceptions, the degree of policy 
implementation in the region has been low, as already indicated in Peres (1997); 
particularly clear results are provided by Alonso (2003) concerning the situation of the 
five Central American countries and Fairbanks and Lindsay (1997) concerning the 
Andean countries that designed competitiveness strategies based on clusters 
development. 
The situation in terms of policy evaluation is also unsatisfactory. Although there are 
assessments of a number of specific programmes,17 together with general assessments 
of what happened after policy implementation or aggregate results (not always 
determinant by the policy being evaluated), impact evaluation in the region is sparse and 
not robust. It hardly ever identifies and tests cause–effect mechanisms. Lack of 
information frequently hampers policy evaluation. In addition, the instruments seldom 
explicitly establish the criteria and mechanisms for follow up and evaluation. Also, 
there is a lack of consensus on how to evaluate complex policies with multiple targets, 
objectives, and lines of action.  
Even though the discussion usually focuses on the lack of evaluation of past and 
ongoing programmes, policies seldom reach the stage in which they need to be 
evaluated. Countries dispose of policies which have been formulated, approved and 
announced, but which are not always implemented. Various factors are responsible for 
widespread implementation failures and for the consequent shortfall between design and 
execution; among them we highlight the following. 
Non-operational or unachievable goals 
Objectives specified through declarative statements without setting clear, measurable 
goals, and without effective mechanisms for financial resource allocation, hamper 
policy evaluation. An evaluation of success factors in the 41 Colombian sectoral 
agreements shows that: (a) those with well-structured, quantifiable commitments and 
specific time horizons were easier to monitor and fulfil; (b) agreements with few and 
simple commitments tended to be more successful; (c)  the leadership and decision-
                                                 
17 Two examples are Silva and Sandoval (2003) for SME support policies in Chile, and Baz et al. (2010) 
for a set productive development programmes in Mexico.   10
making power of the individuals who negotiated the agreements played a fundamental 
role; and (d) production chains in which support was carried out prior to the agreements 
achieved better results (Velasco 2003). Given that practice in the region often makes no 
attempt to take these success factors into account, policy documents tend to be shopping 
lists of needs and objectives. Although the multiplicity of goals may reflect the 
involvement of many stakeholders in complex societies, it also indicates an inability to 
choose priorities and build consensus around a small number of attainable goals. 
Lack of human and financial resources to implement policies 
This issue is particularly relevant in small and poor countries which often depend on 
external aid (loans or grants) to design and implement their programmes. In addition to 
a lack of resources, policies are usually announced without considering their cost and 
the corresponding needed financing, assuming once again that ‘first we decide and then 
we see what can be done and with what resources’. Moreover, given that financial and 
fiscal subsidies necessary for the implementation of the winning policies are themselves 
losing policies, a sharp contradiction arises. Thus, policy implementation deteriorates 
when governments that want to support industrial development through winning 
policies are seldom able to implement them because of the lack of effective fiscal and 
financial instruments. 
Poor institutional capabilities 
Nearly all of the countries of the region lack institutional capacity for policy 
management and implementation. This shortcoming is greater when policies aim to 
replicate international best practices, rather than responding to the needs of the countries 
interested in applying them. This tendency results in policy designs that are 
disconnected from reality, often promoted by institutions of scant political weight in the 
structure of governments, or by business associations that are unrepresentative and have 
little economic and political clout.18 The problem is further aggravated by the tendency 
to separate the design from the implementation. Although countries can increase their 
institutional capacity over time, and some have done so in the region, institution-
building requires stability of objectives for longer periods than the time horizon of a 
government (between four and six years). Also, the wide range of the fiscal pressure 
between countries, from less than 10 per cent to over 30 per cent of GDP, introduces 
differences in terms public resources available to support policies. 
Weak economic signals 
There is a proliferation of plans and programmes designed merely to respond to political 
pressures from economics stakeholders, for complying with conditionality to access 
international funding or to fulfill with legal or constitutional provisions. The will and 
strength the private sector showed to support the ISI is not present anymore. Business 
associations have scantly supported most of the recent efforts to diversify the production 
                                                 
18 For example, in a recent evaluation of the implementation of several programs in Mexico, Baz et al. 
(2010) indicate that PDPs are often uncoordinated, redundant, or even incongruent with each other.   11
structure beyond competitiveness programmes.19 Actually, tariff protection used during 
the ISI was a most powerful economic signal (‘invest in a new sector and get rich’); 
nowadays many policies must be disguised under a ‘market friendly’ non-
discriminatory approach. At best, the entrepreneur is offered a package that is complex 
to conceptualize and operate, and whose impact on profitability is uncertain and far 
from clear. It is hardly surprising that there is a perception that ‘policies do not work’. 
Despite these limitations, in some countries there were significant efforts in institution-
building for policy design and implementation. Thus, the Colombia National 
Competitiveness Commission or the Chilean National Council on Innovation for 
Competitiveness strengthened their operations, while Brazil put in place a complex 
institutional structure to implement and follow up the 2008 Production Development 
Policy. Under strategic guidelines determined by a National Industrial Development 
Council (CNDI)20 and the general coordination of the MDIC, an Executive 
Secretariat—integrated by the Treasury (Ministerio da Fazenda), BNDES, and ABD—is 
the core policy operator. This sui generis institution aims at overcoming organizational 
bottlenecks within the government, where some powerful agencies operate with 
overreaching autonomy, not always paying attention to strategies designed at the highest 
hierarchical levels (Suzigan and Furtado 2006). 
Moreover, in the last two decades many countries of the region increased their capabilities 
to create spaces for debate between public authorities and business chambers for policy 
design and, in a few cases, for implementation. Significant progress has been made in 
developing public-private dialogue. The process reached a stage in which the leadership of 
policy proposals has often been exercised by business associations.21 Business chambers 
have participated actively in consultative forums discussing measures in support of 
competitiveness, such as the National Competitiveness Council in Colombia, the 
Production Development Forum in Chile, or the ‘sectoral chambers’ and National Industrial 
Development Council in Brazil.22  
On the contrary, policy coordination with other civil society organizations has been 
much weaker. Although labour unions have participated in discussion forums, in 
general their presence has not been decisive for the dynamics of such mechanisms. An 
exception, however, is the role played by unions in Brazil, especially in the ‘sectoral 
chamber’ of the automotive industry. Other stakeholders played a marginal role, with 
the exception of the academic sector, which was directly involved in the efforts of the 
                                                 
19 Moreover, differences between the government and the private sector, although less than before, are 
far from having disappeared, as shown by Alonso (2003) for Guatemala and Scarone (2003) for 
Uruguay. 
20 CNDI was created in 2006 and includes representatives of 13 sectoral ministries, the BNDES, and 14 
business associations. It is chaired by the MDIC. 
21 Examples include the Asociación Nacional de Industriales of Colombia, the Confederación de 
Cámaras de la Industria de Transformación  in Mexico, the Asociación de Industriales in the 
Dominican Republic, the Cámara de Industrias in Costa Rica, or the Federación de Cámaras 
Industriales de Centroamérica, which promoted an Industrial Modernization Agenda in Central 
America. In these countries and elsewhere, it is even possible to speak of public-private co-
responsibility in policy formulation, rather than policy consensus (Peres 1997). 
22  In Brazil, the expression ‘sectoral chamber’ (cámara sectorial) refers to a tripartite government-
entrepreneurs-workers negotiation space.   12
National Competitiveness Council in Colombia and which participated in the design and 
management of the sectoral technology funds in Brazil. 
Implementation failures and the perception that ‘policies do not work’ undermine their 
legitimacy and their acceptance, especially among their main beneficiaries: the 
entrepreneurs. This gives rise to the paradox that business people bemoan the lack of 
resources available for policies, while at the same time they fail to make full use of what 
is available. Overcoming these implementation failures and making sure that 
instruments designed actually function, is one of the key challenges for industrial 
policies nowadays. What can be done to close the gap between what is decided and 
announced, and what is actually done and evaluated? Three lines of action, which are 
not mutually exclusive, look promising and should be followed up. 
First, policy design should be accompanied, not followed, by explicit consideration of 
the institutions that will have to implement them. This means involving industrial policy 
stakeholders and creating institutions which allow this participation on a continuous 
basis. Although reform of the state and organizational development are not issues that 
are close to the industrial organization specialist, they need to be addressed to reduce 
implementation failures. Second, there is a need to increase the amount and the quality 
of human recourses specialized in policy design and implementation, prioritizing the 
latter, even through transfer of qualified personnel. A third line of action is to develop 
and strengthen the institutions and the individuals that link policy design and 
implementation. Three courses of action are available for that purpose: strengthen 
public institutions, search for leaders in the private sector, and strengthen intermediate 
implementation agents, such as business associations. 
The countries of the region accumulated sensible experience in terms of policy 
management in the areas of macroeconomic policy and central banks; such experience 
could and should be replicated in areas linked to industrial development. Private 
leadership of policies has been efficient in some cases (e.g. in the development of local 
clusters), and should be used whenever possible, but experience shows that this approach 
is hard to replicate and it is not distributed according to implementation needs. Thus, 
economically weak areas that need major efforts from policy operators tend also to have 
weak private leaderships. The strengthening of intermediate implementation bodies has 
been a successful strategy in countries such as Chile, where it has been used to carry 
through programmes to promote SME networks, although they suffer from the predictable 
problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. Different arrangements are possible. 
None of them is a panacea or easy to implement, but they do open up alternatives and 
deserve to be explored from perspectives that combine the economic, institutional, and 
management dimensions. 
4 Conclusions 
Industrial policies are the core of specialization or diversification strategies. There are 
five key points in elaborating an industrial development strategy: (i) the criteria for 
targeting production sectors; (ii) the mix of policy instruments associated to each 
objective; (iii) the constraints imposed by endogenous capabilities; (iv) political will; 
and (v) the institutional capabilities to manage that strategy and the amount and 
continuity of financial resources available for implementation. Regarding targeting 
production activities and sectors, the policy should recognize that, while there are no   13
blueprints for prioritizing sectors, history shows that countries have in fact chosen and 
continue to choose sectors on the basis of a few more or less precise criteria. The 
knowledge-intensity of the activities in question, their dynamism in the international 
market as a result of high elasticity with respect to world income, and their potential for 
productivity growth, are some of the general criteria used ever since by countries to identify 
sectors to promote structural change. These criteria are supported by others related to the 
strategic nature of certain activities, which basically reflect their importance in output, 
exports, or employment, usually at the national level, but also with a local or sub-national 
dimension. 
From the 1980s, the technological ‘dimension’ has increasingly been used to define the 
scope of industrial policies. Although we can define industries or production sectors as 
sets of goods with high cross-price elasticity of demand, it is possible to define as 
sectors also sets of activities which share a technological path (Robinson 1953; Dosi 
1988). One can therefore speak of the aerospace, biotechnology, or ICT sectors. To 
promote activities encompassed by a given technology, there are as many experiences 
centred on horizontal policies as others involving direct intervention at the level of 
firms, market segments, or knowledge networks. In practice, policies to promote 
clusters are frequently inseparable of innovation or technological development policies. 
As policies acquire systemic scope, their impact on competitiveness in the economy at large 
requires special attention. The higher costs associated with the initial stages of learning 
curves should not be so high that they endanger the competitiveness of firms that use the 
new goods or services that are being incorporated into the basket, particularly when those 
firms have a strong foreign trade orientation. The balance between supporting the 
diversification of the domestic production structure and taking advantage of opportunities to 
import cheaper capital goods or better technology is not easy to strike— it can only be 
found through experimentation and trial and error, i.e. we need pragmatic rather than 
ideological policies. As pragmatic policies are frequently of a reactive type, a major 
challenge for the region is to combine pragmatism with much more proactive policies. 
In Latin America and the Caribbean, the tools available to implement industrial policies 
are well-known and present in the policy discourse. The big difference with respect to 
past experience in the region and elsewhere stems from the current open-economy 
scenario, in which it is impossible to use instruments involving widespread and 
permanent trade protection. This constraint weakens the economic signal (expected 
profitability) sent to potential investors in new activities, and causes a significant 
portion of the cost of development activities to fall on the fiscal area. This leads to 
problems, both in setting priorities for the allocation of budgetary resources, and for the 
stability of those resources at times of fiscal constraint. 
The sustaining of long-term development instruments, possibly spanning more than one 
government term, remains a challenge that the countries of the region have so far been 
unable to tackle successfully. Another powerful tool of sectoral policy, direct 
investment by the state, is off the policy agenda in most countries, but the degrees of 
freedom in this subject are large, as shown by various experiences, particularly at the 
local level. Experience in the region suggests that the policy packages applied so far 
have not had the force to induce specific investment behaviour that protection had in the 
past, although the cumulative effects remain to be evaluated.   14
In the case of small economies, apart from these constraints, it has been argued that they 
not only should not develop sectoral policies, but in fact cannot do so. Without ignoring 
the importance of the domestic market to achieve economies of scale and learning, it 
should be remembered that the issue is less important in open economies, as shown by 
numerous small countries that operate as highly competitive export platforms. Although 
institutional capacity can also be a major constraint, especially in the short-run, this 
does not mean that it is impossible to implement industrial policies, rather that their 
scope should be in accordance with those capacities. In other words, the alternative is to 
focus efforts downward rather than shooting wildly into the air. 
Despite these considerations, from the standpoint of political will, sectoral measures 
face ambivalence in the region—enjoying high levels of legitimacy in some countries, 
although always less than during the ISI period, but very low levels in others. 
Nonetheless, even in countries that do not consider themselves legitimate, actual 
practice is far more ad hoc, and often specific measures are implemented to support 
sectors in crisis. Given the need for these policies to move development forward in the 
region, it is worth asking what needs to be done to increase their legitimacy. 
There are two priority areas of action. First, implementation capacity needs to be 
improved to narrow the gap between policy design and institutional capacity for 
effective implementation, the persistence of which undermines the credibility of policy 
makers and hence the policies themselves. Second, significant progress also needs to be 
made in evaluating the impact of the initiatives implemented in terms of their ultimate 
objectives: economic growth, technological progress, and increased productivity. When 
public resources are scarce, only sound evaluations can create space to divert resources 
from other policy areas to these ones. 
Although these points are not new, they are crucial. Some progress has been made on 
this issue, examples being Mexico’s Business Development Program 2001–06 or 
Brazil’s 2008 industrial policy, which explicitly mention quantitative targets, improving 
previous practice. Nonetheless, progress in the region as a whole is insufficient. This is 
very serious for policies that have to justify their own raison d’être and compete for 
fiscal resources with others that enjoy greater legitimacy, such as basic education, 
public health or citizen safety. As industrial policies are crucial for diversifying the 
production structure and fastening the pace of productivity growth, they need to regain 
their legitimacy by demonstrating their impact. 
From a broader perspective, some crucial questions remain unanswered. If, in the late 
1990s, an analyst who advocated industrial policies had been asked to design an ideal 
political scenario for their acceptance and implementation in the region, they hardly 
could have hoped for a better environment than that which exists today. At present, 
political parties or coalitions of parties that based much of their long-term platforms on 
the rejection of ‘economic neoliberalism’ are in power in Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, 
Chile, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Industrial policies had frequently 
been mentioned by these parties as a substantive part of their strategic guidelines for 
achieving sustainable development with greater social justice. 
Reality appears not to have fulfilled those expectations. Even in the most advanced 
example of policy development and actions (Brazil), the perception is that a lot has to be 
done in terms of what is needed to change the production structure of the country. In 
short, there has been no significant action in most of the countries mentioned above to   15
change the current economic model, in terms of its pattern of production specialization, 
through the application of industrial policies. 
Two explanations may be attempted. The first would be that the discourse of the 
opposition was rapidly constrained, upon its rise to power, by the pressure of global 
financial markets and the existing consensus as to what constitutes a ‘responsible’ 
macroeconomic policy, and that, as part of the same move toward international 
acceptance, the discourse of structural change was relegated to second or third place. 
Naturally, once countries showed they held ‘responsible’ policies, their degrees of 
freedom increased, and, if they wanted to do so, they were able to undertake bolder 
actions to diversify their production structure. The most notorious case is Brazil’s, and 
the most recent Uruguay’s, where the administration that took office in March 2010 
began almost immediately the formulation of an industrial policy for 2010–15, which 
includes significant sectoral components (Torres 2010). 
Another explanation might be that, without denying the significance of the factors 
mentioned above, the structural change or industrialist discourse lacked the strength to 
show that it could be translated into specific operational proposals, capable of yielding 
at least a few results that were attainable within the space of a single administration. If 
the second explanation is correct, one might conclude that the main concern of 
structural policy analysis should be to pay attention to governments that wish to carry 
out such policies, as they might not know how to do so and, if they did, would scarcely 
have the time needed for those policies to yield results that strengthen their position and 
allow them to remain in office. 
Even if policies to diversify the production structure can technically demonstrate their 
capacity to generate positive impacts, it is by no means clear which stakeholders would 
be interested in generalizing them in the countries of the region. In other words, which 
stakeholders are likely to put their economic and political resources behind initiatives 
that go beyond support for cluster development, the great majority of which are in any 
case far from well-funded? Industrial policies have been making a (slow) return in Latin 
America and have been able to operate, albeit on a small scale, in open economies and 
with orthodox macroeconomic policies—contrary to the previous conventional wisdom 
that they were incompatible. Enhancing their, if not minimal then at least marginal, 
status requires stakeholders, including the state, to take ownership of them and commit 
their power and resources behind them. 
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